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SPEECH 



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HON. JACOB COLLAMER, 



ON PRESENTING 



A MBIORIAL FROM INHABITANTS OF SWANTON, VT., 



PROPOSING '^ / 




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AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, 



DELIVERED 



IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY T. 1661. 



WASHINGTON: 
1861. 



SPEECH. 



Mr. COLL AMER said: 

Mr. President, I have a memorial which I desire to present, I pre- 
sent the memorial of J. Blake, and eighty-one others, inhabitants of 
Swanton, Vermont, praying for the adoption of the measure com- 
monly known as the Border State propositions. It is rarely, I think, 
that I trouble the Senate, but I desire now to make some remarks, for 
which I beg indulgence for a few moments, in relation to this subject. 
I am not proposing to make remarks about secession, or coercion, or 
slavery, or the merits of any of these topics at all ; but the petition 
which I have presented invokes the exercise of the power of Congress 
in relation to amendments to the Constitution. It is upon that topic 
that I wish to speak for a few moments. 

Mr. President^ I am willing at all times, when the occasion prop- 
erly calls for it, to exercise the poAvers that we legitimately have by 
the Constitution ; but, in my estimation, no exigencies can ever justify 
us in resorting to any sort of devices and expedients which the occa- 
sion may call for, that are not consistent with the fair construction of 
the provisions of that instrument. Now, sir, what is the true mean- 
ing, the fair import, of the powers which are given in the Constitution 
to Congress in relation to its amendment ? 

When tlie Constitution was adopted, and those who made it were 
about to put in exercise this great experiment, having created for the 
first time a Greneral Government with all its departments, and cur- 
tailed in large proportion the powers which the States had previously 
exercised, to correspond with it, they said: "Now, it may be that this 
Constitution does not invest sufficient powers in the General Govern- 
ment for its smooth and successful operation. Experience may show 
that. What, then, shall be done in such a contingency? It will be 
a contingency in which Congress will have ascertained by experiment 
precisely what further power they need. We say, therefore, that when 
Congress have thus ascertained that they need any more delegated 
power, they shall have authority to jDropose amendments to the Consti- 
tution, which they shall send to the States or to the people of the Uni- 
ted States (if you please) in their States, either in convention or in their 
legislatures, for their adoption; and if three fourths of them adopt 
them, they shall become a portion of the Constitution." 

This was wanted for the use of Congress. No occasion was required 
for calling any national convention ; but the occasion would be one 
which experience would develop, and which Congress would feel the 
need of, and such was the arrangement to meet that contingency. But 
they further said: " Perhaps upon experience and upon trial, it will 
turn out that we have transferred too much power from tlie States to 

" S4 Hf 



the General G-overnment ; it may work hard for the States ; they may 
need to have amendments ; now, Avhat provision shall we make, what 
arrangement shall we jjrepare for such a contingency ? It cannot be 
reasonably expected that Congress will, in such an event, make any 
propositions for amendment to strip themselves of power which has 
been already delegated to them. We, therefore, must not look to 
Congress for relief in such an emergency at all. Hence it was that 
provision was made in the same article for such an event, for such a 
contingency, by providing that if two thirds of the States shall pass 
resolutions requesting the call of a general convention for the purpose 
of proposing amendments to the Constitution, Congress shall call it. 

They said, if the States want the Constitution amended, let them 
amend it as it was made, by a national convention ; let them see each 
other all around ; let them compare their views ; let them see each other 
face to face, and then make such arrangements as the circumstances at 
the time may require ; and when they have thus proposed their amend- 
ments. Congress shall send those propositions to the States, either in 
their Legislatures or their conventions, for adoption. It will be 
observed that in the latter arrangement the first leading feature is 
this : when the people or the States want amendments which they sup- 
pose they need, they are to have them whether Congress will or not ; 
if they call a national convention in this way, Congress has no power 
to stop it, but is obliged to call it without knowing what amendments 
will be proposed. The States are not bound, in their resolutions which 
ask for a general convention, to state what amendments they want; 
but simply to declare that they want a convention ; and Congress, in 
case two thirds of the States join in the call, is bound to call it. And 
again, when it is called, and it proposes amendments, Congress has no 
right to examine into the merits of those amendments, but is bound to 
send them out to the States at once. It is imperative on Congress to 
do so. 

Hence it is we see, Mr. President, provision is here made that 
amendments to the Constitution are to come from those who want 
them. No idea entered into their heads in 'those days that the old 
rule of common sense would be overthrown, which is, that proposi- 
tions for relief of any kind should come from those who want it, and 
not from those who do not want it. Now, let us apply this to our 
present condition. Does this General Government feel the want of 
any more delegated power? Has experience shown that our General 
Government does not operate smoothly for the want of some other 
delegated power that we need? Not at all. No 6ne suggests any- 
hing of that kind; we want nothing of that kind. What next? 
What is wanted, or what is said to be Avanted? It is said that a 
number of the States desire amendments to the Constitution for their 
security ; I am not about to enter into the merits of those amend- 
ments; but I say that is said to be the case. Now, is it not, from the 
provision of the Constitution to which I have alluded, perfectly 
obvious as to how such an object is to be reached? I think it is clear ; 
it leaves no doubt about it. Well, sir, have any of these States ever 
made any attempt to call a national convention to get a redress of 
grievances according to the Constitution? Not one. Some of them 



have flown into secession ; others are threatening it ; but not an at- 
tempt has been made by any of them to get any redress within the 
Constitution at all. I have nothing to say of that, particularly; but 
I say that Congress ought not to undertake to exercise the power 
which is given to get amendments which they need, for the purpose 
of getting amendments for the States, whicli it is said they need. It 
is to pervert the uses for which it was given to them by so doing. 
Such attempts will always fail; and it is obvious why they will fail. 
First, we undertake to conjecture what the States want. We are 
going about here framing amendments to send out to the people. 
What amendments? Anything we want or need? No; but some- 
thing which it is conjectured the States need. Who knows what 
they need? Who knows what they want? Who knows what 
they will be satisfied with? Have they manifested it to us? In no 
way. It is a mere matter of conjecture ; and however much respect I 
may have for the source from which these conjectures come, still for 
all I cannot but see that it is a lame and impotent attempt to use a 
power which was granted for one purpose to effect another and an en- 
tirely different one. 

Now, Mr. President, let me go a little further, to show its inap- 
plicability. Suppose we agree to the amendments here. Have the 
people of the different States ever seen each other in convention, and 
understood each other's views about them? Never at all; but we are 
going to make them up here, and invent them ourselves, initiate 
them, and send them out to the States, and ask them to act upon them 
without ever seeing each other at all. The attempt never can succeed. 
In the nature of the thing, it cannot succeed. The provision of the 
Constitution is not adapted, never was meant, to secure any such pur- 
pose by the action of Congress, originating amendments for the States, 
which they have not asked for. 

The conclusion, tlien, I come to, after what reflection I can give it, 
is tliat, as I view this i)art of the Constitution — which I think very 
clear when read and considered in the light of the circumstances in 
which it was made — I never can undertake to particij)ate here in under- 
taking to make up, and invent, and contrive, and conjecture amend- 
ments for States which the States themselves have never asked for. I 
think it is entirely malapropos. It will be entirely unsuccessful; and 
the very fact now that you find such odds and ends, such various 
opinions about what they shall be, and a thousand projects that are 
presented to us, the very fact that you find yourselves in this condi- 
tion, manifests that the principle which I state is right. It shows 
that you are in this condition because you are trying to use an instru- 
mentality which you have for one purpose for another, for whicl} it 
was never prepared, and to which it is not at all adapted. Now, Mr. 
President, I have one other 

Mr. BIGLER. I ask the Senator from Vermont to tell us how he 
reconciles the theory which he lays down with the fact that the very 
first amendment made to the Constitution with reference to the sover- 
eignty of States was submitted by Congress? 

Mr. COLLAMER. I will answer you entirely, if you will hear me 
throuo;h . 



The PKESIDING OFFICER. It is the duty of the Chciir to an- 
nounce that the hour for the special order has arrived. 

Mr. COLLAMER. I hope I shall be allowed to goon. ["Cer- 
tainly!" "Certainly!'-'] 

Mr. FOOT. I hope, by common consent, the special order will be 
passed over informally, until my colleague shall have concluded his 
remarks. I presume the whole Senate are desirous to hear him upon 
this point. [' ' Certainly ! " ] 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no objection, the Sena- 
tor may proceed. The Chair hears none. 

Mr. COLLAMER. I have said nothing, and shall say nothing 
which can possibly involve the feelings of difierent sides, or different 
parties in the Senate. At this time, I have nothing to say about that. 
I rise to make remarks due to myself in relation to the memorial 
which I have presented, which invokes the exercise of the power of 
Congress in relation to constitutional amendments. 

An illustration may be drawn from our history, in confirmation of 
the principles which I have stated. In the election of President of 
the United States, in 1801, it was found that the arrangements which 
had been made in the Constitution did not operate smoothly. There 
was almost a failure in the government. Congress then thought the 
contingency had arisen for which this provision was made, and Con- 
gress proposed an amendment in order to be relieved of that difficulty. 
They sent it out to the States. That was exactly what Congress ought 
to have done. It was adopted. 

I come now to another thing, which I was just about to speak of 
when the Senator from Pennsylvania interposed. It is quite easy to 
imagine — and our own history presents a precedent for it — this state 
of things. Suppose, for instance, a State, or a certain number of 
States — not two thirds — do not desire to call a general convention, 
either because of a want of time or some other excuse, no matter 
what ; they desire no general revision ; they only desire one or two 
particular amendments; and suppose that one, two, three, or more 
States, in like condition and circumstances, should state to us that they 
desired the following articles of amendment to be adopted as part of 
the Constitution of the United States, (naming them,) and they pre- 
sent these to Congress, with the petition or request that Congress will 
submit them to the conventions or the Legislatures of the different 
States for adoption ; now suppose such a state of things presents itself: 
how would that fall within the principles which I have before re- 
marked upon? When Congress prepares amendments to the Consti- 
tution, and sends them to the people, they express their approbation 
of them ; it implies that they are their amendments ; they make them 
— and it requires two thirds to do it; which implies, I take it, the ex- 
ercise of their judgment, and a judgment so decisive as will carry two 
thirds of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. They are 
the amendments which Congress want, and which Congress approve. 

But suppose one, two, or three States should draw up some amend- 
ments that they say they do want ; not that we conjecture at ; not that 
we guess; but which they say they do want: what will you do in 
"such a case? Suppose some of the States prepare and reduce to proper 



form the amendments which they desire ; and they have so much con- 
fidence in their sister States that they are willing to submit them to 
them ; for that very desire and request to submit them implies a con- 
fidence; now, what should Congress do on an occasion of that kind? 
I think it is quite clear what they should do. I believe Congress 
should not pass on the merits of those amendments. It is a petition, 
a respectful petition, a suitable petition. I think that Congress should 
not present them as their amendments. Well, how would you do it? 
I would do it in this way. I would recite that whereas such and such 
certain States (naming them) had prepared such and such articles of 
amendment to the Constitution, and had presented them to Congress, 
and had requested Congress to submit them to the States, therefore, 
and in pursuance of that request, Congress present them to the States 
for adoption ; and do it by the two-thirds majority required by the 
Constitution to render the proposal efiective. 

I grant, when they are amendments which Congress prepared, un- 
doubtedly it is implied that they express their approbation of them ; 
but in the' case I am supposing, and which I consider a middle case 
between the two, no approbation or disapprobation of Congress is 
expressed or implied, nor is it necessary. Let me read the article: 

"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro 
pose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two 
thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in 
either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Con- 
gress." 

It does not say that Congress shall recommend the amendments, or 
any of them. It is said that they shall propose the amendments, but 
not that they shall recommend them. I think Congress, when there 
is a respectful petition by any State for certain articles of amendment, 
should pass such a joint resolution as I have just indicated, with the 
recital or preamble thereto. 

Nov.^, I come to the case that the Senator from Pennsylvania alludes 
to. When the States adopted, in their several conventions, this United 
States Constitution, several of the States recommended certain amend- 
ments ; a number of the States did ; I do not know whether two thirds, 
or all; but a number of them recommended certain amendments to the 
Constitution. What did Congress do with them? They were not 
amendments that Congress prepared. What did they do ? The States, 
in their conventions, had requested these amendments to be adopted. 
What did Congress do? I will turn gentlemen to what they did on 
that occasion, as', if you please, a precedent for what I state. In 1789, 
in the First Congress, was passed the following : 

"The conventions of a number of the States, having, at the time of their adonti.-.y the 
Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to present misconstruction or abuse of its powers, 
that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added; and as extending the ground 
of public confidence in the Government, will best insure the beneficent ends of its institution; 

" Resolved by ike Senate and House of Representatives of the United Stales of ,'lmeiica in Con- 
gress asseiMlcd, (two thirds of both Houses concurring,) Thai the following articles be pro- 
posed to the Legislatures of the several States, as amendmenis to the Coustitufion of th& 
United States, all, or any of which articles, when ratified by three fourths of the :;aid Legis- 
latures, to be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of said Constitution."' 



8 

There is a direct precedent for the case to which the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania calls my attention ; that is the very case which I have 
now supposed. There the States, or several of them, did request 
amendments to be made, stating what they were, and Congress did not 
propose those amendments, as theirs, but they passed a joint resolu- 
tion, stating the fact that several States had requested those amend- 
ments to be made, and therefore they presented them to the people for 
adoption. That was the very case. That is in confirmation of my 
view. It is a direct precedent. 

Now, Mr, President, without taking- up the time of the Senate, 
which I dislike to do exceedingly, these views govern me in my action 
in relation to amendments to the Constitution, though they probably 
may not govern anybody else. I should like to have them understood 
more at large, because I think the people have been, somehow or other, 
led to look to Congress for relief by constitutional amendments ; when 
the powers of Congress, as I understand them, are utterly unadapted 
to them. But I cannot say, as I frequently hear said in this body, 
that I desire to speak to the country. I have no idea that tire country 
will ever hear what I say about it ; but still I liave presented my views 
of what I regard true duties. 

And now, I have to say that, though I see little prospect of amend- 
ing in this way, confident it can never succeed, yet after all something 
may be done. I have nothing to say about calling a national conven- 
tion. That is a matter for the States and the people to do as they 
please upon. It is perfectly evident from the Constitution, that it was 
intended to be called whenever it was desired by the States, without 
any action of Congress at all ; but even in despite of its opinion, if 
you will. Though men may not agree upon amendments here, may 
not agree upon amendments in the conference that is going on now in 
this city, I can still conceive it possible that two^ or three, or more 
States might agree on some amendments, and send them here, as is 
proposed in the resolutions of Virginia, with the request that we 
should send them out to the Legislatures of the States. I say I can 
con^ei e that that contingency may happen, and my mode of treating 
that subject would be what I have indicated. I think, in my humble 
ju ^-ment, that on such a contingency Congress should pass a resolu- 
tion, such as they did in 1789, reciting that this had been requested, 
and presenting it to the people by a two-thirds vote, and not stand up 
and say they did not like the amendments, and would not permit the 
people to have a chance to vote on them. Such are my views, sir. 

The memorial was ordered to lie on the table. 



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